Apple Scores 83/100 but should it be higher?
A top-of-the-class business — but can a Kiwi afford it right now?
I ran Apple through my 100-point Buffett screener.
It scored 83 out of 100.
That’s “high quality” (70–84 on my scale), just short of “exceptional” (85+). It puts Apple among the best businesses I’ve screened — only a handful of the roughly thirty companies I’ve run have scored this high. And Apple should be higher.
Eighty-three is not 100. And the two places Apple lost points are the most interesting part of the whole exercise. On the scoreboard they look like flaws but on a closer look neither really is — and one of them is really a strength. That gap, between what the screen flags and what’s actually going on, is exactly why a screen still needs a human if you want to find the best companies.
Great! So, am I buying as much Apple as I can?
In a word, No!
I love the company. It truly is exceptional. But, even great companies aren’t worth an infinite amount.
And, for Australian or New Zealand investors looking to the US, the pricing question has a second layer an American never has to think about. More on that below.
The score: 83 out of 100
Here’s the full breakdown, metric by metric, with the points scored against the maximum:
Gross profit margin — 15/15. Apple’s gross margin is around 43%. It keeps 43 cents of every revenue dollar before operating costs. The iPhone premium, the App Store take, the AirPods markup — in a single number.
Net earnings trend — 3/10. Apple’s net income rose in only four of the last seven years — small dips in 2019, 2023 and 2024 — so the screen, which rewards a steady year-on-year climb, marks it down. Worth a flag, but milder than 3/10 makes it sound. More on that below.
Operating expenses — 5/5. Overheads are low relative to gross profit. The brand does the marketing for them.
EPS trend — 10/10. Earnings per share have climbed almost every year — helped enormously by relentless share buybacks, which shrink the share count even when total profit wobbles.
Current assets vs total debt — 0/10. The lowest score on the board — but, as we’ll see, the one I’d take with a pinch of salt. Apple’s current assets cover only about 60% of its total debt. On a conservative balance-sheet test that’s an outright fail — but it’s entirely deliberate, and arguably a smart move rather than a weak one. Hold that thought.
Debt safety — 15/15. Despite that, Apple’s earnings are so vast it could clear all its long-term debt in just over a year if it chose to.
Return on equity — 15/15. Extraordinary — well over 100%, because years of buybacks have shrunk the equity base so far that the profit dwarfs it.
CapEx — 10/10. Capital-light. Selling another App Store subscription costs Apple almost nothing.
Net profit margin — 10/10. Around 24% of every revenue dollar becomes profit after all costs and tax.
Score: 83/100 — high quality, and right at the top of the band. One genuine weakness (the lumpy earnings) and one deliberate quirk (the tight balance sheet) — and as you’ll see in a moment, that second one is arguably not a weakness at all.
First, those “lumpy” earnings
The screen is right that Apple’s net profit hasn’t risen every single year. But look closer and it’s hardly alarming. The dips are shallow — the worst, in 2019, was about 7%; the 2023 and 2024 dips were under 4% each. Revenue and gross profit have climbed far more smoothly, and the overall trend is firmly up: net profit has roughly doubled over the period.
So what caused the wobbles? Mostly deliberate reinvestment — operating expenses, R&D especially, have risen every single year as Apple builds for the future. Layer on the COVID demand surge and its hangover, and a one-off tax charge in 2024 (most of that year’s dip came from below the line, not the business — which is why 2025 snapped straight back to a record), and the “lumpiness” looks less like a weakness and more like a healthy company spending on its future while absorbing a few one-offs.
The screen can’t see any of that. It just counts the up years. That’s not a criticism of the screen — flagging it is exactly its job — but a 3/10 here is a prompt to investigate, not a verdict.
Is that 0/10 really a weakness?
I don’t think it is — and Mary Buffett, whose book Warren Buffett and the Interpretation of Financial Statements is where this whole screen comes from, makes exactly this point.
She notes that Coca-Cola, one of the great durable-advantage businesses, has often run a current ratio at or below 1 — its short-term obligations exceed the assets it could quickly turn into cash. For an ordinary company, that’s a warning sign. For a business with enormous, reliable earning power and easy access to cheap credit, it isn’t: it can cover those obligations out of next quarter’s profits without breaking stride.
With Apple it goes a step further — the tight balance sheet isn’t an accident, it’s a deliberate and rather clever piece of management. Apple generates so much cash that sitting on a big pile of idle current assets would simply be wasteful. So instead it hands cash back to shareholders through buybacks and funds part of itself with cheap borrowing. For a business this profitable, carrying low working capital and a bit of debt is efficient — it works for shareholders, not against them. The only reason it’s safe is the reliable earnings underneath it; for a weaker company, the same balance sheet would be reckless.
You can see that safety sitting right there in Apple’s own scores: 0/10 on liquidity, directly beside 15/15 on debt safety — it could repay all its long-term debt in just over a year. Those two readings aren’t a contradiction. Together they’re the whole picture: a company that chooses to run lean because it can.
So is Apple really only “high quality”? On the mechanical score, yes — 83 sits right at the top of the band, just shy of exceptional. But neither thing holding it back is the red flag the raw number suggests: the earnings wobble is mild and largely down to good reinvestment, and the tight balance sheet is a deliberate strength dressed up as a weakness. Weigh both properly and Apple looks every bit an exceptional business.
As Mary Buffett puts it, these checks are prompts to think, not to give you a definitive yes or no answer. The screen flags. The brain decides. You need both.
Which leaves just one thing standing between Apple and a buy: the price.
The time I baulked — and bought anyway
In July 2022, I was putting together my Sharesies portfolio. Apple had scored well. But the stock was trading at roughly 20 times earnings. That gave me pause.
The framework suggests buying at or below fair value — and at 20x earnings, Apple wasn’t cheap. My conservative intrinsic value calculation put the fair value significantly lower.
But then I did something I recommend to anyone doing serious research into US stocks: I checked what Berkshire Hathaway was doing. Berkshire files quarterly 13F statements with the US Securities and Exchange Commission — public documents that show exactly what they hold and whether they’re buying or selling. In their 2022 filings, Berkshire was still adding to its Apple position.
Warren Buffett — the man who built the framework I was using — was still buying at 20x earnings.
That was enough for me. I bought.
Apple is now one of my better-performing positions. At the time of writing, it’s trading at close to 40 times earnings.
Why I’m not buying more
I said at the top I’m not adding to my Apple. Here’s the full reason — and it’s the same one Charlie Munger gave about Costco.
Munger loved Costco — admired the culture, the management, the business model. But when the stock reached 40 times earnings:
“The trouble with Costco is it’s 40x earnings. But except for that, it’s a perfect damn company.”
He owned it, would never sell it, praised its future — but wouldn’t buy more at that price.
Apple at 40x earnings is my Costco.
The business is as strong as ever — the 83/100 score hasn’t changed. But the price has changed dramatically, and price is what determines your future return.
To justify 40 times earnings, you need to believe Apple will grow earnings at roughly 15–20% per year for the next decade. Not impossible. But it’s an aggressive assumption built into the price you’re paying today — and remember, this is a business whose earnings have actually fallen in three of the last seven years. The framework is deliberately conservative, and at 40x earnings, there’s almost no margin of safety left.
And for us, there’s a second price tag
Here’s something an American investor never has to think about, but every Australian and New Zealand investor does: the exchange rate.
When you buy a US stock, you’re making two bets at once — one on the company, and one on the currency. You pay in US dollars, so the price you *actually* pay depends on what your Kiwi (or Aussie) dollar is worth on the day.
I have a simple rule for US stocks: I only buy when the New Zealand dollar is at its 10-year average against the US dollar, or stronger. The logic is the same discipline as the Buffett framework itself — don’t overpay. A weak local currency is just another way of overpaying, even when the stock’s US-dollar price looks fair.
In July 2022, when I bought Apple, the NZD was sitting around 0.63 — right about its 10-year average at the time. The currency wasn’t working against me, so the only question was the stock itself.
Today, the New Zealand dollar buys about 0.58 US dollars — roughly 11% below its 10-year average of around 0.65 (Reserve Bank of New Zealand figures, June 2026). So for a Kiwi investor, Apple isn’t just twice as expensive on earnings — it’s a further ~8% more expensive again, purely because of the currency.
The double whammy for a New Zealander buying Apple today: roughly twice the earnings multiple of 2022, and a dollar worth about 8% less to pay for it.
And here’s the part the big US newsletters never mention, because it never occurs to them to: it’s not the same story across the Tasman. As of June 2026 the Australian dollar is sitting almost exactly on its own 10-year average against the US dollar. So an Australian investor buying Apple today faces the valuation problem — but not the currency one. Same stock, same day, genuinely different decision depending on which side of the Tasman you’re on.
There’s a flip side worth noting. A weak Kiwi dollar is bad for buying US stocks, but good for selling them. If I ever convert my Apple gains back to New Zealand dollars, the weak currency works in my favour — I’d get more NZD back than I would have at 0.65. (More on exchange rates and US investing in a future post — it deserves one of its own.)
The thing to understand about quality and price
The Buffett screen answers one question: is this a great business? Apple, at 83/100, is a high-quality business — though not a flawless one.
The intrinsic value calculation answers a different question: am I being asked to pay a fair price for it? And for those of us outside the US, there’s a third: what is my own currency worth today?
At 20x earnings in 2022, with the NZD near its average: uncomfortable, but Berkshire was still buying — so possibly yes.
At 40x earnings today, with the NZD well below its average: no — at least not under conservative assumptions, and not for a New Zealander.
This is the central tension in long-term investing. The best businesses almost never trade cheaply. The market knows they’re excellent and prices them accordingly. The skill is in waiting — for a correction, a bad earnings quarter, a sector rotation, or even a favourable swing in the currency — and being ready to buy when the great business briefly becomes available at a fair price.
I’m not selling my Apple. But I’m not buying more either.
Until the price makes sense again — the earnings multiple, the fair value range, and the exchange rate — it stays on the watchlist. Set an alert. Wait.
All fair value calculations use: EPS growth capped at 8%, future P/E of 15, required return 10%, 10-year forecast. Company data from Financial Modeling Prep and SEC EDGAR 13F filings. Exchange rate data from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and Reserve Bank of Australia, June 2026. This is not financial advice. The information in this newsletter is educational and based on publicly available data. It does not take into account your personal financial situation, goals, or risk tolerance. Always do your own research or consult a licensed financial adviser before making investment decisions.